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The British share in the war

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# THE BRITISH SHARE IN THE WAR.

BY  
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# THE BRITISH SHARE IN THE WAR.

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The time has arrived when it seems useful to attempt an answer to a question, so elementary that a smile may rise to the lips at the mere mention of it, but nevertheless like many elementary things vital to the right understanding of contemporary events and tendencies. The question which we propose to answer is this. What has the British Empire done in the War? All the world knows what the German Forces have done. They have taken Liège, Namur and Antwerp, are in occupation of nine-tenths of Belgium, of ten departments of France, including the most wealthy and metalliferous regions, and of the greater part of Russian Poland; and as these lines are being written they are battering at the defences of Warsaw. After nearly a year of warfare on two fronts they have succeeded in keeping the struggle on the enemy's soil and have been able substantially to maintain the tremendous military advantage which superior mobilisation and overwhelming numbers gave to them in the first month of the war. And the work of the Russian Empire is equally plain and palpable. That great agricultural state, grievously hampered by deficient railways and roads, and suffering all the drawbacks and delays which are incidental to the conduct of modern warfare by communities still imperfectly industrialised, has nevertheless by its obstinate and splendid valour withstood the whole military weight of the Austrian and a considerable portion of the military weight of the German Empire, fighting always against forces more numerous and better equipped than its own, and in spite of local reverses which might have been decisive in an ordinary war and against an ordinary people, still preserving its line unbroken and the spirit of its armies undiminished. The world also is in no manner of doubt as to the brilliant and sustained heroism of the French nation. It regards and with justice the recovery of France after the first reverses of the war as one of the most signal moral triumphs recorded in history. Here was a nation possessing indeed a national army and yet so little dreaming of the possibility of war in the summer months of 1914 that at the supreme political crisis the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister were out of the country, a nation which having experienced the horrors of invasion and the shame of defeat within living memory had no wish to challenge a war now, and knew well that if a war were forced on her, the chances of victory would weigh light against the prospects of collective martyrdom. Yet though taken by surprise and so outnumbered in the initial encounters of the campaign that the enemy's outposts were within a day's march of the capital, it has contrived by a combination of cool and clever



strategy, brilliant valour and a patient tenacity hitherto unsuspected in the national character to repel, to hold and then gradually to wear down the enemy. Supreme among the reputations won on land in the present war is the name of Joffre, the modest republican son of a cooper who leads the armies of France.

In comparison with these resounding achievements what has the British Empire to show for its great wealth, its wide territories and teeming population? The British Fleet is the first in the world in point of size and reputation, yet it has bombarded no German town, sunk no German battleship, landed no force on German soil. It might have been expected that the strongest navy in the world would have been in a position to force its way into the enemy's waters and to bring on a general engagement with the enemy's fleet. But the British Navy has not done this.

On the contrary without any general engagement, it has by the mere attrition of the campaign suffered more loss in capital ships and heavy guns than its opponent.<sup>(1)</sup>

It may easily be imagined how for those who thus depict the exploits of the strongest arm of the British service, there is little evidence of material power in the exploits of the British army. It would be admitted by all that it has fought well and gallantly, that its steady behaviour during the retreat from Mons probably saved the left wing of the French army, and that since its numbers have been augmented it has become a serious factor in the Western line of defence. But the question commonly asked is not whether the British forces have done well but whether they are doing enough. Do the achievements of the British army, measured by the scale of the present war constitute a contribution to the allied cause proportionate to the strength of so great an Empire? The British army holds a front of forty-four miles; the French army holds a front of four hundred and six miles. The British army has repulsed several serious onslaughts on its positions, successfully stemmed the German rush to Calais, and won a smart local victory at Neuve Chapelle. But month after month has passed and it still stands where it stood in November last. Judged as the contribution of a world-wide Empire may not this achievement be described as disappointing?

This depreciating view of the British effort has been encouraged by the spontaneous avowals and enforced silences of the newspaper press. It is part of the national habit to be self-critical, and if there be any dirty linen on the premises the newspapers will see that it is washed in public. We are all nervously anxious to repair mistakes, to do better in the future than we have done in past and to throw every ounce of the national force into the struggle. And these entirely creditable motives have been combined with a good deal of insincere and forced depreciation in those organs of the press which are anxious to promote conscription. Holding the view that a compulsory system of national service is right and necessary these newspapers eagerly dilate upon

(1) It is rumoured that a German battleship has been sunk by a British submarine in the Baltic, but the loss is neither acknowledged by the German nor claimed by the British Admiralty. For the comparative losses of the two navies see Appendix A.



the shortcomings of our present voluntary method of obtaining men for the army and upon the many signs of deficient foresight and organisation which the campaign has brought to light. Other papers, differing from this view but nevertheless anxious to save the country from the dangers of complacent acquiescence give prominence to the heaving and uneasy movements of the labour world and to the many obstacles which oppose an accelerated output of things necessary and vital to the war. We learn of high war profits on the one hand, of strikes actual or threatened on the other. A parliamentary paper is issued on the disgraceful delays caused in many dockyards by the drunkenness of a section of workmen. Columns are written on the retarding influence of Trade Union rules and customs and the "slacker" is denounced on every side with a unanimity and vehemence of reprobation which certainly spreads far beyond the literate class. We discuss our failings openly and with passion, making no concealment of shame where shame is due and if the note is sometimes overstrained, there is no great cause in this for lamentation. A democratic state depending for its armies and munitions upon voluntary effort cannot afford to be silent as to its wants and failings lest the springs of actions be blunted and amendment be postponed beyond the season of effectual repair.

But if we are bound to be outspoken as to our deficiencies we are compelled to the rule of silence as to much of our past achievement and as to all of our future designs. We cannot tell the world the strength of our army in France or how many men and guns we have sent to the Dardanelles or how large a force we are reserving for Home Defence. Though we know that our rate of shipbuilding is the fastest in the world we must be silent as to the new battleships, cruisers, submarines and destroyers which are steadily raising our margin of naval superiority, already great before the war, over the fleet of our adversary. We can say nothing as to the additions to our aircraft, as to increased and increasing output of our munition factories or as to the measure of financial assistance which we have rendered to the allies. These things are known to the Government: the ordinary citizen hardly enquires concerning them, acquiescing in that state of contented ignorance which in war time becomes one of the cardinal virtues.

Let us, however, confess at once that as we are experiencing the benefits, so we are also suffering from the drawbacks of our insular position. Secured from invasion by the fleet, the less instructed part of the population finds it difficult to realise the urgency of the danger. They see around them the same peaceful fields and villages, the same busy towns, the same pleasant and familiar accessories of a rich and thriving civilisation, to which they have been accustomed from childhood, and it requires some stretch of imagination to realise that the country is at war at all. We have the reputation of being a slow people, without much imagination, and reluctant to make comprehensive plans and hurried changes. We have generally gone into our wars without much preparation, conducted them with a strong admixture of initial inefficiency but finally won through by persistence and with the aid of brilliant talents often tardily discovered. Our weakness



has always been in lack of military organisation, our strength in the resolution never to accept defeat. In the language of the racecourse we are "bad starters but good stayers." It is, however, a very remarkable feature of this war that Great Britain was for a wonder perfectly, indeed exquisitely and to the smallest detail prepared to play the particular part which had been cast for her in the event of her joining hands with France and Russia against the German Powers. Her fleet was powerful and already mobilised. Her Expeditionary Force was of the highest quality and ready for action. The commissariat and medical arrangements had been well and carefully planned. If the idea generally entertained in Great Britain had been correct, namely that France and Russia with the aid of a small British force would be able to hold up the German forces on land, then the British preparations were more than adequate. They were excellent.

But the idea was, wholly incorrect. The German forces proved themselves to be far stronger, not indeed than they were already known to be by our military experts, but than the public opinion of this country, always imperfectly informed of foreign military affairs, had surmised, and in a month it became clear that what was wanted was not a hundred thousand British fighting men on the Continent but a million. The nation woke up to the situation with surprising alacrity, the Universities leading the way and emptying themselves in patriotic emulation. By the spring of this year over two million men had been added to the forces of the Crown.<sup>(1)</sup>

There were, however, two inter-connected sources of weakness which gave and continue to give anxiety—the supply of munitions and the relations between labour and capital. The munition factories in England had been developed upon a scale adjusted to supply the needs of a large navy and of a small land army. For the provisioning of an army running into several millions and engaged upon a war in which the expenditure of ammunition has outrun all previous calculation, the British firms were wholly unprepared. New workshops had to be built: new machinery had to be constructed, and before shops and machinery were ready a considerable interval of time must necessarily elapse. Great efforts were made but not upon a plan sufficiently comprehensive or with due provision for a rate of expenditure which greatly exceeded the precedents of earlier wars. All kinds of difficulties arose with respect to the execution of contracts so that when in May the hour for advance had struck, the distressing discovery was made that the supply of high explosive shells was insufficient.

To this obstruction which might no doubt have been avoided by greater foresight but which is in the main attributable to the small scale of our military establishment before the war there is superadded the national legacy of a long and bitter quarrel

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<sup>(1)</sup> Precise figures are not available. One may perhaps assign a *minimum* of a million to the new armies (May), a *minimum* of half a million newly recruited into the Territorial Force, and perhaps another half a million recruited to repair the wastage of the original Expeditionary Force. These figures are *minima* and do not include the Colonial levies.



between capital and labour in certain important branches of industry. Output has been limited in accordance with Trade Union rules. Disputes about wages have led to strikes and men and masters have been alike accused of using the war to better their material condition. At times the national conscience has been gravely perturbed by these proceedings and fears have been expressed that a small but important section of the population is impervious to the appeal of patriotism. That this evil is not so widespread as foreign writers sometimes imagine, is capable of overwhelming proof, but the state of the labour market has been sufficiently serious to call for exceptional legislation.

Such being the main grounds for the apprehension that the heart of Great Britain is not wholly in the struggle, it may be useful to point out concisely and without exaggeration what the British Empire has actually contributed to the Allied cause. A brief recital of the facts will be sufficient to show that the difficulties, obstructions and mistakes to which allusion has been made weigh light in the balance against the service which Great Britain has rendered and is rendering to the Allied cause. And an even more important conclusion will emerge. It will become clear that the force of the Empire is cumulative, that it increases week by week and month by month, and that whereas the initial advantage lay wholly with our enemy, time will inevitably fight on the Allied side.

What then has the British Empire contributed to the Allied cause?

It will be convenient to consider in the first place the work of the British Navy.

1. The British Navy has swept the German Flag off the high seas. But for its assistance, the German Navy, being more powerful than the French, would have bombarded French coast towns, sunk several French warships, intercepted French commerce, and endangered the transport of African levies to the theatre of war in France. The intervention of the British Navy has not only saved our Ally from these certain and formidable dangers. It has been the means of sinking 40 German warships, 5 Austrian warships and 6 Turkish warships, of capturing at sea or sinking 116 German traders, exclusive of 18 enemy vessels captured near the Suez Canal zone, and exclusive also of the 69 German vessels which were detained in ports in the United Kingdom, of the 34 which were detained in British ports abroad and of the 26 which were seized on entering British ports after the outbreak of war.

2. It has consequently utterly interrupted all German overseas commerce save such as is carried on within the confines of the Baltic.

3. It has completely defended the coasts of Great Britain and France not only from the fear of an enemy landing but from the fear of any serious marine attack.

4. It has ensured the safe transport of large forces from India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to Europe, of a large army from England to France and of considerable forces from England to Egypt and the Dardanelles.

5. It has enabled munitions of war and provisions of all kinds to reach Great Britain and France from the United States of America and from other parts of the globe, and at the same time has intercepted the supply of such munitions to the enemy countries. How valuable its services have been to our brilliant ally France is generously acknowledged by a French writer in the following passage<sup>(1)</sup> :—

“If at the beginning of the war we were enabled to complete the equipment of our army with a rapidity which has not been one of the least surprises of the German staff, we owe it to the fleet which has given us the mastery of the seas. We were short of horses. They were brought from Argentina and Canada. We were short of wool and of raw material for our metal industries. We applied to the stock-breeders of Australia. Lancashire sent us her cottons and cloth, the black country its steel. And now that the consumption of meat threatens to imperil our supplies of live stock, we are enabled to avoid the danger by the importation of frozen cargoes. For the present situation the mastery of the sea is not only an advantage but a necessity. In view of the fact that the greater part of our coal area is invaded by the enemy, the loss of the command of the sea by England would involve more than her own capitulation. She indeed would be forced to capitulate through starvation. But France also and her new ally Italy, being deprived of coal and therefore of the means of supplying their factories and military transport, would soon also be at the mercy of their adversaries.”

6. It has enabled the general commerce of the British Empire and of our French ally to be carried on in time of war almost as freely as in time of peace and this despite the initial ravages of some scattered German cruisers and the subsequent operations of the German submarines. On 23rd October, 1914, when the war had lasted two and a half months the British Admiralty issued the following notice :—

“The percentage of loss is much less than was reckoned on before the war. Out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade, only 39 have been sunk by the enemy, just under one per cent. in all. The rate of insurance for cargoes, which on the outbreak of the war was fixed at five guineas per cent., has now been reduced to two guineas per cent. without injury to the solvency of the fund. For hulls, as apart from cargoes, the insurance also has been considerably reduced. Between 8,000 and 9,000 foreign voyages have been undertaken to and from United Kingdom ports, less than five per 1,000 of which have been interfered with and of these losses a large number have been caused by merchant vessels taking everything for granted and proceeding without precaution as if there were no war. On the other hand, the German oversea trade has practically ceased to exist. Nearly all their fast ships which could have been used as auxiliary cruisers were promptly penned into neutral harbours or have taken refuge in their own. Among the comparatively few

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(1) *Le Temps*—Juin 28.



German ships which have put to sea, 133 have been captured or nearly four times the number of those lost by the very large British mercantile marine."

This communication was issued while some seven or eight German cruisers were still at large. These cruisers were rapidly swept off the seas and after the battle of the Falkland Islands on December 8th the sole effective weapon of the German powers against the overseas commerce of the Allies has been the submarine. That the German submarine has inflicted damage upon British commerce is not denied. It has made war upon unarmed and defenceless crafts, carrying no contraband of war, and has succeeded in violation of the elementary principles of humanity in drowning the crews of fishing craft, merchant vessels, and of a large liner carrying passengers. But the essential point to retain in the mind, if we wish to form a just estimate of the military and economic situation, is the fact that the German submarine despite its much-vaunted activities has not hitherto seriously affected the volume of our overseas commerce. The port of Hamburg is dead. It is as dead as was the port of Marseilles during the continental blockade in the later years of the Napoleonic Empire. But the ports of Great Britain are alive with commercial enterprise. The number of sailings is sufficiently numerous to prove that. The nerves of the marine population are utterly unshaken by the new peril which has been added to the existing dangers of the deep. It is enough to glance at the following list of total arrivals of oversea steamers of all nationalities (over 300 tons net) to and from the United Kingdom ports (a) since the commencement of submarine attacks on merchant vessels, (b) since the commencement of the submarine blockade.

(a) Week ending:—

January 27	...	...	...	1,503
February 3	...	...	...	1,420
„ 10	...	...	...	1,413
„ 17	...	...	...	1,438

(b) Week ending:—

February 24	...	...	...	1,381
March 3	...	...	...	1,474
„ 10	...	...	...	1,557
„ 17	...	...	...	1,539
„ 24	...	...	...	1,450
„ 31	...	...	...	1,559
April 7	...	...	...	1,234
„ 14	...	...	...	1,432
„ 21	...	...	...	1,519
„ 28	...	...	...	1,441
May 5	...	...	...	1,604
„ 12	...	...	...	1,427
„ 19	...	...	...	1,438
„ 26	...	...	...	1,323
June 2	...	...	...	1,382
„ 9	...	...	...	1,335
„ 16	...	...	...	1,347
„ 23	...	...	...	1,469

8. It has exercised a control over the trade of neutrals with the enemy countries, intercepting contraband of war without molestation from the enemy. The extent of its activities in this direction may be gauged by the fact that about 640 writs for condemnation of ships or cargoes or both have been issued in the United Kingdom.

9. It has been sufficiently strong not only to guard the coasts of Great Britain and France, to protect the transport of troops to the Continent and to intercept all oceanic commerce with the enemy, but also to aid in the great work of forcing the Dardanelles and to conduct operations in Samoa, the German New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall and Caroline Islands (in conjunction with Japan), the Cameroons (in conjunction with the French), Walfisch Bay, German East Africa, Tsingtau (in conjunction with Japan), the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Alexandretta, the harbour of Smyrna, the Falkland Islands. In addition to this British submarines are now operating in the Baltic (where they struck a German warship) and in the Sea of Marmora (where they have sunk several Turkish transports), and a British naval officer has received an honour from the King for his brilliant work on the River Danube.

10. It has already caused the loss of several German colonies, such as Samoa, Togoland, New Pomerania, and so long as it continues to maintain its present ascendancy the reduction of the remaining colonies of the enemy will necessarily be effected in course of time. Indeed German East Africa and the *hinterland* of the Cameroons are now the sole surviving fragments of the great German Colonial Empire.

11. It has proved its superiority in open fight against detachments of the German Navy on three occasions, in the action of August 28 in the Bight of Heligoland, at the battle of the Falkland Islands on December 8, and again in Admiral Sir David Beatty's action of the Dogger Bank on January 24, when the *Blücher* was sunk and the *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* were set on fire. The significance of the last-named action was thus accurately expounded by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

"The great merit of Sir David Beatty's action is that it shows us and the world that there is at present no reason to assume that ship for ship, gun for gun, and man for man, we cannot give a very good account of ourselves. It shows that at five to four in representative ships—because the quality of the ships on either side is a very fair representative of the relative qualities of the lines of battle—the Germans do not think it prudent to engage, that they accepted without doubt or hesitation their inferiority, that they thought only of flight as our men thought only of pursuit, and that they were wise in the view they took, and that if they had taken any other view they would have unquestionably been destroyed."

12. By securing to the Allies the control of the seas, it has enabled Serbia to be supplied with munitions of war and was thus indirectly the cause of the remarkable recovery of the Serbian army in December 1914, when the Austrians were suddenly driven



out of the country with a loss of over sixty thousand prisoners and Belgrade was recaptured.

The preponderance of naval power having so emphatically declared itself to be on the British side it may be asked why the British navy does not forthwith search out the German Fleet, in its own waters and forthwith destroy it. The answer to this question is that such a proceeding would be contrary to every principle of sound naval strategy. A fleet is unlike an army in being composed of a comparatively few very costly units, the loss of which can only be repaired after a considerable efflux of time. A General may risk a battalion or even an army corps upon a costly enterprise and the risk may be legitimate, for the loss may be almost immediately repaired. But it takes a year to build a battleship, and many years to make a naval officer. Consequently any serious loss in important naval units is not a temporary injury which may be repaired in the course of a war, but a permanent and irremediable calamity. Such a risk the British Fleet, with its great responsibilities for the safeguarding of British commerce and the transport of troops over sea is not entitled to run. It is sufficient to remark that since the first day of the war its pressure has been such that for all serious purposes the ambitious navy of the German Empire might never have been built at all.

This astounding but not unexpected achievement has been the result of incessant and vigilant activities of which the land-faring population of Europe has only the faintest notion. While the German Navy, save for its submarines, is quietly resting in harbour or at least in home waters and behind the shelter of its mine-fields, the British Navy is in perpetual motion, escorting transports, chasing submarines, scouting by day and night, summer and winter, fair weather and foul over the cheerless waters of the North Sea and risking mines and submarines to report the faintest sign of movement of the adversary. An army is comparatively stationary but a navy which commands the seas is in perpetual motion. Where our ships are only the Admiralty knows. But the common man who must resign himself to ignorance is safe in assuming that during every minute of the day and night every ship in the British Navy is the scene of some relevant and important activity.

Sometimes this ubiquity of our naval power receives a public illustration and we learn that ships which we had assumed to be in home waters have been suddenly and secretly concentrated and despatched to the other end of the earth. The battle of the Falkland Isles is a case in point. On November 6 the Admiralty received information of the loss in action of the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope* off the Coast of Chile in a contest with a German squadron not only possessing a marked superiority in speed and in weight of armament, but fighting with every advantage from the light. A month later the defeat was avenged. On December 7 a strong British squadron was lying at Port Stanley among the mists and moors of the Falkland Islands, and there in the South Atlantic a battle was fought on the following day which put a final end to Admiral von Spee's squadron of the Pacific. Four German cruisers, bravely fighting their guns to the end were sunk

under the powerful gunfire of the Invincible, the Inflexible, the Carnarvon, the Kent, the Glasgow, and the Cornwall. It was a signal illustration of the reserve strength of the British Navy, for rarely has a blow at a very distant object been prepared with such profound secrecy or delivered with such crushing force.

In a word the British Navy has done all and more than all that its most sanguine supporters expected of it. War is full of surprises and the present war has upset every prophecy but one. The Germans have not got to Paris, the Russians have not got to Cracow, but "Britannia rules the waves." If there has been no general engagement between the Grand Fleets the fault does not lie with the Admirals and Captains of the British Navy. They are ready enough to fight and the Germans know it. But so long as the main objects which the navy exists to secure are obtained, so long as Great Britain and her Allies are protected, provisioned and munitioned, it is no part of prudence to court unnecessary risks. The business of the British Fleet is to keep in being, for not only does the success of the allied operations depend on the command of the sea, but command of the sea secures ultimate victory. Let us consider what is involved in this governing fact. The British Fleet keeps open for the Allies an inexhaustible reservoir of men and of supplies. It makes the manhood of the British Empire and of the French colonies available for service in the war. It matches the German coal and iron conquests in Belgium and the northern departments of France by the vaster resources of the New World. If the resolution of the Allied armies does not fail—and it will not fail—the British Fleet secures for them a formidable auxiliary, for Time is on the side of the Powers who can "call in the New World to redress the balance of the Old."

That England should be powerful at sea has been a vital maxim of national policy since the sixteenth century. The navy has been the popular service, the child of the House of Commons, the acknowledged and necessary guardian of the whole fabric of our commerce and empire. It was a very general belief that given a navy sufficiently strong to protect our overseas trade and to make invasion impossible the country had nothing further to fear. It was argued that a great army levied upon the continental scale would be a superfluity, superfluous if the navy were adequate to its task, but equally superfluous if it should prove insufficient, for in that case the country would be starved into submission without a blow struck on land. There were indeed some powerful advocates of a system of national military training for home defence, and as an additional insurance against a successful invasion, but nobody on either side of politics dreamed that the country would ever be committed to participate in a war upon the mainland of the Continent with a force approximating to the scale of continental armies. Even Lord Roberts, the most illustrious protagonist of the scheme of national service, proposed no addition to the regular forces of the Crown liable to military service beyond the seas. His scheme was framed for home defence and inspired by the prospect of a duel between Germany and England.



Great Britain was not then, when war broke out, a military country as that term is understood upon the Continent. It had no conscript army like the French, no scheme of compulsory military training like the Swiss. For its war service both on sea and land it depended entirely on voluntary effort. It possessed a highly trained regular army consisting of some 233,000 on the active, and 203,000 men on the reserve list, an Indian army of about 150,000 men, and a Territorial Force of volunteers for Home Defence numbering some 263,000 men. Nobody, however, could predict how many regular troops could be safely withdrawn from India, nor how many Territorials would volunteer for foreign service, nor what would be the military value of a Territorial regiment in a modern Continental campaign. These problems were not matters of public speculation because the country at large did not believe either in the imminence or in the likelihood of a European war. On the contrary it was never more hotly engaged in domestic controversy than when the war cloud suddenly burst over Belgium in the opening week of August, 1914.

The British expeditionary force which crossed the Channel in the second week of August without a single casualty and with a detailed perfection of equipment and mobilisation which was to no one more astonishing than to ourselves consisted in the first instance of two divisions only. For its size it was probably the best fighting force in Europe, for it was composed of highly-trained long-service soldiers many of whom had been through the Boer War, and all of whom were in the pink of physical condition. Though it proved to be comparatively weak in machine guns and heavy artillery, its cavalry was splendidly mounted, and its aircraft superior to that of the enemy in reconnaissance and attack. But hardly had this small force taken up its position on the French frontier when it was compelled to execute the most difficult operation in war—a strategic retreat. Europe needs no reminder of how the British Army fought that retreat from Mons to the Marne under the scorching eye of an August sun, maintaining its disciplined coherence in the face of overwhelming forces, and so covering its rapid movement by a series of desperate actions, that it helped to save Paris and so to determine the whole course of the Western campaign. But the high military qualities displayed in the course of the retreat were, if possible, even less remarkable than the spirit of the British Army at the end of it. Where other troops might have been depressed, the British were exultant for they had taken the measure of their adversary and judged themselves, perhaps rashly, to be superior at every point of the game. "Our cavalry go through the Uhlans like brown paper," said a General, and it was a common impression among the rank and file of the army that "the German infantry could not shoot for nuts." Nothing is so infectious as confidence. From the cheery Tommies of these indomitable battalions, a conviction of certain victory ran like wildfire through the Allied armies of the West.

The principal lesson to be drawn from the opening weeks of the campaign in the West was that the military situation could not be restored without powerful reinforcements from Great

Britain. Even after the enemy had been repulsed from the Marne to the Aisne by the brilliant combinations of General Joffre, the position was still very anxious, for the numerical preponderance rested with the enemy and new armies were pouring through Belgium to reinforce him. Sir John French then took a decision which proved to have a momentous bearing upon the subsequent development of the War. The course of the campaign had brought the British Army into the centre of the French line of the Aisne, a position inconvenient for its communications with the Channel ports and consequently opposing obstacles to its easy and regular expansion by drafts from home. The British commander accordingly represented to General Joffre the desirability of transferring the British contingent to the extreme left of the French armies where they might be in closer geographical connection with England and protect the Channel ports from seizure by the enemy. The plan was accepted and executed with brilliance. By the second week of October the British Army was holding the line in Southern Flanders, and there it has remained to this day barring the Northern gateway into France.

Once transferred to the North the British Army was called upon to discharge an office, the gravity of which cannot be over-estimated. An effective offensive was out of the question, for though the losses incurred in the first two months of the campaign had been repaired and the army augmented by a third corps and two divisions from India, it was vastly outnumbered by the forces which the Germans were in a position to bring against it. But as a sample of defensive warfare against overwhelming odds it would be difficult to match the defence of the Ypres salient by the British troops during the great battle which begun on October 20 and ended with the repulse of the Prussian Guards on November 11.

“Let us put the achievement in the simplest terms, Between Lille and the sea the Germans had not less than a million men. Six of their 14 army corps were of the first line, and even the new formations were terrible in assault—more terrible than the veterans, perhaps, for they were still unwearied, and the edge of their keenness was undulled. The immature boys and elderly men, who often fell to pieces before our counter-attacks came on with incredible valour in their early charges. They were like the soldiers of the Revolution, the more dangerous at times because they did not fight by rule. Against that part of this force which faced us we opposed numbers which began by being less than 100,000 and were never more than 150,000. In the actual salient at Ypres we had three divisions and some cavalry, during the worst part of the fighting to meet five army corps, three of the first line. For the better part of two days one division held a front of eight miles against three army corps. In this mad *melée* strange things happened. Units became hopelessly mixed, and officers had to fling into the breach whatever men they could collect. A subaltern often found himself in command of a battalion; a brigadier commanded one or two companies, or a division, as the fates ordered. At one moment



a certain brigadier had no less than thirteen battalions under him. Yet as Sir Henry Rawlinson said in his order to the gallant 7th Division, "The men stood firm and defended Ypres in such a manner that a German officer afterwards described their action as a brilliant feat of arms and said that they were under the impression that there had been four British Army corps against them at this point."<sup>(1)</sup>

In the first battle of Ypres the British Army, 150,000 strong, repulsed a series of attacks extending over three weeks and delivered by a force of half-a-million men supported by a superior weight of artillery. But the second battle of Ypres, though superficially less sensational than the first, for the disparity in numbers between the forces engaged was greatly reduced, furnishes an equally striking proof of the quality of our troops. It was a battle, lasting from April 22nd to May 13th and beginning with the complete and sudden rout of a French division on our left which caused a rent in the line so wide that an enemy led with becoming vigour should have had no difficulty in bursting through to Calais. How that rent was cut and how closed is the story of this desperate second struggle at Ypres. The French Colonial division which suddenly on April 22nd deserted its trenches and left its 50 guns to the enemy was a body of excellent fighting men hardened to all the ordinary incidents of war whose abrupt and costly failure was to be explained by the employment of a weapon which did not and should not belong to the usages of warfare. The poison gas of the Germans coming as a complete surprise threw the Zouaves into confusion and for many days, until a suitable remedy was found, caused grave losses among the British and Canadian troops who were suddenly called upon to defend a new and unprepared position under every disadvantage and to face an overwhelming bombardment from the enemy with scarcely any artillery support. In this critical and nerve-racking struggle the British Army succeeded in its task and the new German "technical weapon" which will never against be used with equal prospect of success was defeated by the sheer personal courage of our troops.

What that courage is like and why it is that the British infantry soldier has come to regard himself as more than a match for his adversary may be gathered from a few incidents chosen out of an almost endless list of signal acts of valour.

At Verneuil Private George Wilson of the Highland Light Infantry accompanied by one man attacked a German machine gun. "His comrade was killed, but he advanced alone, shot the officer in charge, and captured the gun after shooting or bayoneting the six Germans who worked it." On October 23rd near Bixshoote one platoon of Division 1st Battalion Queens attacked and captured an inn, taking eighty prisoners, *i.e.*, nearly double their own strength. On October 26th, two privates of the 2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards, were out on patrol, when endeavouring to penetrate the enemy's support line suddenly

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<sup>(1)</sup> John Buchan, *History of the War*, Vol. IV., pp. 114-116.

encountered a German patrol of six men, being actually within the German outpost line. They promptly attacked this patrol, killing three men, wounding a fourth, and brought back the rifles of the four Germans disabled as well as furnishing an accurate report. On October 22nd, one platoon of the 2nd Battalion, Worcester Regiment, held up for the whole day some 400 to 500 Germans who were endeavouring to mass in front of their trench. On October 17th, the 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment was ordered to attack the village of Herlies, which lies at the foot of a long and gentle slope, perfectly open and devoid of corn. The battalion had to advance over this ground in the face of a heavy fire from German infantry in trenches protected by wire entanglements, these infantry being supported by machine guns and a horse artillery battery. The battalion had to cover 1,450 yards to reach the village. It advanced in lines working its way forward by short rushes. On getting within one thousand yards it began to return the fire poured into it, and still advancing by short rushes worked its way to within 500 yards. Here orders were received that the village must be captured before nightfall. The order to charge was given and the battalion rose as one man and rushed forward. When the Lincolnshires were within 200 yards, the Germans began to waver and many quitted the trenches, and the battalion rushing forward carried the trenches at the point of the bayonet, chasing the enemy through the village. The battalion was assisted by artillery in the advance, but it was exposed to an enfilading fire from the German guns.

Three distinct objects were achieved by the combined action of the British Fleet and Army during the autumn and winter of the first year of the war. The first of these was the protection of the shattered and enfeebled remnants of the Belgian Army against an overwhelming German attack until such time as the flooded Yser provided a strong defensive position behind which the army could be strengthened and reconstituted. The method by which this timely aid was afforded is one of the most singular incidents in the war. A German Army, fresh from the capture of Antwerp was advancing by the coast road upon Nieuport, then defended by a Belgian force inferior to the enemy in every military point save personal valour. Suddenly shell after shell came pouring into the German ranks from the sea. The British Admiralty, having learnt of the German project, had dispatched three vessels, originally constructed for the shallows of the Amazon, to hamper the advance of the enemy, and so effectually did Admiral Hood's naval guns perform their task that Nieuport was saved and the lower reaches of the Yser canal effectually dammed. In the story of the defence of the route to Calais the flooding of the Yser plays an important part.

The second object achieved by the British forces during these months was to secure a period of delay during which Great Britain might raise and equip new armies for the War. For our country time was five-sixths of victory. We were totally unprepared for a war upon a Titanic scale. We had neither the men nor the guns, nor the munitions of war, nor the framework of an industrial organisation adjusted to a struggle upon



such a scale. We had to rely upon our small regular army, upon some divisions from India, and upon our territorial regiments which had been raised for home service only, somehow or other to hold the line until new armies had been raised, uniformed and trained to reinforce them. The whole Flanders campaign, therefore, has been, from the point of view of Great Britain, one great delaying action fought, in the first instance, with incredible valour and against enormous odds by a very small but splendidly trained army, which has gradually received successive increments of strength until its numbers are sufficient to take the offensive.

How rapidly and effectually those new armies have been raised is one of the finest episodes in our national history. When a country is invaded, its homesteads fired, its women folk assaulted, its wealth plundered, its innocent civilian population terrorised by a brutal soldiery no artifice is required to bring the terrors of war before the minds of its population. The manhood of an invaded country fights under a stern and unrelenting stress of bitter determination to free the sacred soil from the insolent presence of the barbarian. Every man knows his duty instinctively. It is plain and palpable before him. But in the case of Great Britain and her colonies there was no such clear and unmistakeable message to the mind and conscience of the common man. The whole territory of the British Empire, with the important exception of the South African Union, was by reason of the supremacy of the British Fleet immune from invasion. Nobody in Great Britain had the slightest fear that the Germans had it in their power to devastate Kent or Suffolk, to burn down Canterbury Cathedral, or to shoot batches of shopmen and country parsons, and a nation of narrow-minded egotists might have been contented with this measure of security. But the crucial fact to be retained by all who would understand the strength and purpose of the British Empire is that without the prospect of invasion, the United Kingdom and its Dominions have behaved almost as if invasion were actually taking place. It has sometimes been said that the voluntary system has failed. But what country has ever raised over sixty per cent.<sup>(1)</sup> of its total recruitable strength for service beyond the seas in a few months? Nor is this the term of our effort, for the flow of recruits still continues, refreshed and augmented with every German insolence or striking evidence of British need.

The spirit of these new armies, which were thus rapidly formed under the shelter of our Navy and of the heroes who held the line at Ypres and La Bassée, is no less remarkable than their numbers. One of the most superb exploits in the War was the defence of the lines north of Ypres (April 22-26) by the Canadians after their left had been uncovered by the sudden flight of the Zouaves under the circumstances which have already been related. Another exploit equally sublime was "the Lancashire landing" in the Dardanelles against a rain from rifles

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(1) A calculation based on the assumption that at least four millions of the males of military age are *either* physically unfit *or* required to work the national industries.

and machine guns and heavy artillery and through every obstacle of spike and wire which modern science could oppose. Each of these feats was performed by a body of volunteer soldiers, enlisted on grounds of patriotism, and recently levied and yet showing under the most adverse and desperate circumstances qualities of courage, resource, and persistence which have never been surpassed by the most seasoned veterans of a professional army. Of these new levies only a small portion has, as yet, measured itself with the enemy, but there is no reason to doubt that the splendid fighting quality which that portion has displayed will be equally evident in the battalions which have not yet crossed the sea.

We now come to the third great function which has been so far successfully discharged by the British Army in Flanders. There is an idea that because the British Army now defends a front of some fifty miles only its contribution to the common cause is and must be negligible. This is not so. The importance of an army is to be measured by the strategic value and intrinsic difficulties of the task which it has to perform, and not by the number of miles occupied by its front, and once viewed in this light the value of the British contingent in Flanders is shown to be very great indeed. It will be remembered what was the original German objective in the Western campaign, how narrowly it was missed. The Germans attempted to rush Paris, were foiled by the brilliant strategy and dogged courage of their opponents and were compelled to revise their plans. After some fluctuation and doubleness of aim they determined to strive for Calais, a town in itself old and unprosperous, but symbolising to the German imagination a victory over Great Britain and the control of the narrow seas. Now, no one in Great Britain believes that the capture of Calais by the Germans would decide the War or weaken the resolution of the Allies to continue the struggle to the end. It is sufficient to note that the Germans regard the acquisition of this third-rate French port as an object of the highest political and military value, that in the German Press Calais is depicted as the most convenient starting point for an invasion of England, and that it is a common impression among our enemies that a comparatively small German army, once landed on English soil, would make short work of the inhabitants. Calais has, in fact, become the main proximate object of German military ambition in the western field, and not once nor twice has the great battering-ram of German steel been furiously urged against the force which bars the road.

The kernel of that force is the British Army. It would not be true to say that it has fought with more courage than its French allies, or than its German opponents—for that would be hard, but upon it has devolved the duty of defending a difficult part of the line against the repeated attacks of a vastly superior force, and this office it has discharged with a tenacity and valour which are worthy to rank among the supreme achievements of the War. It will perhaps give some idea of the fierceness of the struggle which has prevailed over this part of the line when



it is stated that the casualties on both sides are probably not much less than seven hundred thousand, and that in the single four days' action of Neuve Chapelle last March almost as much ammunition was shot away by the British artillery as was expended in the three years of the Boer War.

In this murderous collision of nations the main object of the weaker party by land and sea is to wear down the forces of the enemy until weakness has been converted into preponderance. Now the position of the Allied forces with respect to the Germanic Powers is that they embarked on the War with a marked actual numerical inferiority. Neither Russia nor Great Britain were able immediately to put a sufficient weight into the balance to repair the numerical inferiority of France. Their potential resources were great. Their resources capable of immediate mobilisation were in view of the difficult task before them comparatively slender. Great Britain had to find everything but primarily men. Russia with abundant supplies of men had to find munitions. The problem for the Allied Powers was to contain the armies of the enemy, until the huge resources of Great Britain and Russia could be made available for effective use. It did not matter where an action was fought, so long as the enemy forces suffered at least as heavily as the Allies for the principal object of the Allies has been and is to gain time for the full development of their strength against an enemy who has already expended his maximum power and will steadily grow weaker both absolutely and relatively to his opponents.

These general considerations will bring out the special value of the British contribution to the Allied cause. Our intervention in the war has furnished our Allies with the means both of gaining and of profiting by time. If our land army has not been of itself sufficiently strong to re-conquer Belgium, it has materially helped in the defence of France, behind which new armies are being prepared and vast stores of munitions actively accumulated. Though it has continually been engaged with superior forces, it has inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, whose fighting qualities it continues to regard as good but inferior to its own. And meanwhile, under the shelter of the British fleet, munitions and stores of every kind flow into the armed camps of the Western Allies.

It may be argued that in claiming Time as an auxiliary we are making no account of two factors, each of which has been freely cited as likely to weaken and perhaps ultimately break the resolution of Great Britain to proceed in the war, the submarine blockade and the Trade Unions. We do not deny that if the German submarines had the power to starve the country and the Trade Unions the will to starve the war, the enemy would have cause for satisfaction. But neither of these propositions can be maintained. We have now endured five months of the so-called blockade. Our imports for the month of June, 1915, when compared with the imports for the same month in 1914 have increased 28·6 per cent., and our imports for the last five months when compared with those for the corresponding period last year show a rise of 17·8 per cent. Armies march upon their stomachs, and the stomach of the British soldier requires to be filled with

beef. We need not therefore be surprised to learn that there has been a considerable advance in our total imports of meat since last year, a rise amounting to £9,794,000, or 36·2 per cent., for the last five months (February to June, respectively), and to £2,500,000, or 50 per cent. for the month of June. But these figures, though furnishing a remarkable illustration of our continuing ease of importation despite the activities of the German submarines, are less striking than the record of our importation of grain and flour during the same five months. The value of imported cereals has arisen in this period from £26,753,000 to £45,887,000—an increase of 71·5 per cent. Nor has there been any decline in the staple luxuries of the poor. On the contrary, the United Kingdom has imported for the six months ending June 30th, 1915, 163,860,760 pounds of tea, as against 123,230,277 imported last year and 117,460,581 imported in 1913. <sup>(1)</sup>

That there has been a considerable shortage in tonnage since last autumn is true enough. The German and Austrian shipping tonnage which is about one-seventh of the world's tonnage is practically unavailable, and the requisitioning of shipping by the Admiralty and other Governments—and it must be remembered that our Admiralty has taken up about one-sixth of the total number of steam vessels belonging to the United Kingdom—has accentuated the shortage and led to a rise of freight rates. Nevertheless, the position does not seem to be getting materially worse either as regards freight rates or as regards the quantity of tonnage available. Indeed, an examination of certain typical freight rates from March 1st to June 30th, *i.e.*, grain freights from the River Plate to the United Kingdom and coal freights from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean show that the tendency has been, on the whole, downwards rather than upwards, and at the end of June, in both cases, freights were some 25 per cent. lower than at the beginning of March.

There is then, as yet, no indication that the United Kingdom will be starved into submission by the German submarines. We are importing freely, we continue to carry the greater part of the world's trade, and if the available tonnage falls short of the demand, the congestion of our ports is more accountable for the shortage than any apprehension of peril from submarines. It would seem then that we are in a position, so far as our food supplies go, to continue the war indefinitely. Our enemy, it is true, relies upon his new type of submarine, but if a few fast cruisers did not materially affect our overseas trade at the beginning of the war, a few fast submarines will be no more effective now when our general naval power and special experience in meeting submarine attacks have been greatly increased.

Equally vain are the calculations based upon the alleged selfishness of the working population of these islands. That there are egotists among the workmen as among the employers of Great Britain is true enough, but the proposition might equally be advanced against any class in any country in the world. Indeed, the labour situation in Great Britain, when

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(<sup>1</sup>) See Appendix B.



viewed in its larger outlines presents several encouraging features. The artisan population of Great Britain which has sent a splendid contribution to our armies, the miners alone contributing nearly a quarter of a million to the ranks, has from the first recognised to a far larger degree than is sometimes thought, that patriotic duty comes before private advantages. "When the war began," says Mr. Henderson, "the number of strikes existing and known to the Board of Trade was 100. A great majority of these strikes were settled within a very short time after the declaration of war. At the end of August the number remaining unsettled was 20 and these affected only 9,000 workpeople. The spirit which had brought about that result and had been stimulated by the unanimous decision of the three national committees which controlled the trade unionist and labour movements in this country continued operative until the beginning of January, when the number of unsettled disputes had fallen to 10. In February, however, unrest greatly influenced by the large increases in the prices of food began to manifest itself, and in that month there were 47 fresh disputes, involving the stoppage of work. During March, 74 new disputes began; during April, 44; and during May, 63. It was necessary that every possible safeguard against a further increase in the number should be taken. The Government sought to ascertain the views of representatives of leading trades unionists, and at a conference at the Treasury on March 17, 18 and 19 the representatives of 35 of the trade unions principally concerned in the engineering and shipbuilding industries made it clear that during the continuance of the war disputes should be settled without stoppage of work by a system of arbitration." The bearing of the artisan population has in the main been excellent. Thousands of workers—the miners are a striking illustration—have surrendered high wages for the much lower pay of a private in the Army. Thousands of munition workers, as at Belfast and Sheffield, have laboured with admirable resolution and steadfastness under extreme and continuous pressure since the beginning of the war. Almost every labour leader in the country has from the first preached the necessity of subordinating individual and sectional interests to the national cause, and millions have answered the call to sacrifice. Not only, in the words of one of their own leaders, have they raised "an army unprecedented in size, courage and valour for battle on a foreign shore, but without hesitation they responded to the call which was made upon them to sacrifice many of their trade union rules and conditions that had been built up by years of sacrifice. They did that because they felt, as I feel, that no sacrifice is too great to secure victory in this world war."<sup>(1)</sup>

We are confident, despite discouraging symptoms in South Wales, on the Clyde, and elsewhere, that these words addressed by a Labour member to a mass meeting of railway men express the firm and settled resolution of the artisan population of the United Kingdom:—"No sacrifice is too great to secure victory."

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<sup>(1)</sup> Speech of Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P., to the railway men, at Wellingborough. *Daily News*, July 12th, 1915.

Such voices as may be raised for peace at any price are rare and unimportant, and if unrest still prevails in any quarter of the industrial field, it is closely connected with the high war profits of the employer and will tend to disappear under the present scheme for taxing the abnormal revenue which the profit-earner derives from the urgent needs of the State. Meanwhile, it is no slur on the patriotism of the workman if he has argued that while he is ready to do his best for the country, he is not under the same moral obligation to swell the profits of his employer.

Now, the attitude of the working classes of the United Kingdom towards the war is not a progressively weakening, but, on the contrary, a progressively strengthening, attitude. The working men of Great Britain cherish no aggressive designs against Germany. They did not want the war, have nothing palpable or immediate to gain by the war, and are for the most part pacifists in theory, though the best of fighting men should it come to blows. Of any particular dislike of Germans or of Germany the working population of this country was, before the outbreak of this war, wholly innocent. Some big merchants may have envied the Germans, and several active writers in the Press were alarmed by them. Not so the British workman. He neither envied nor feared them, and when the war broke out he had still all to learn about the case against the enemy. The enemy has completed his education. He knows now, from the example of Belgium, what an invaded country may expect from the Germans. He has seen photographs of ruined Louvain, has had authentic reports of outrages committed on the civilian population of that unfortunate country and in the flood of Belgian refugees, homeless and destitute which are now distributed amongst our towns and villages, he has ocular proof of the methods by which the Germans conduct their war. Soldiers from the front, returning wounded or on short leave spread and deepen the painful impression. The country has learned of how hundreds of its bravest men have been first paralysed and then condemned to a lingering and agonising death by a virulent and poisonous gas employed, in the words of Sir John French, with "a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilised war and in flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention." It has learned from the case of the "Lusitania" that a German submarine is prepared to sink a ship crowded with civilian passengers, and that this act of multitudinous murder is commanded by the Admiralty, justified by the Foreign Office, and applauded by the Press of Germany. As a nation we are slow to wrath, but the tide of our indignation is now mounting fast. The working classes of Great Britain have realised the issues, and he little knows the present temper of this country who imagines that a peace will be signed so long as a German soldier stands upon the soil of Belgium or of France to acclaim to the world the triumph of wrong.

The country is well aware of the tremendous sacrifices cheerfully endured by its valiant allies in the struggle for the freedom of Europe. We are not ignorant of the fact that France, with a smaller population than Great Britain, has perhaps a million and a half more men in the field and that grave as have been



our casualties they have been greatly exceeded by the losses of our Ally. But while we realise that we have copious reserves of men still available for military service, we know that vast armies cannot be equipped and trained in a day and that since one of our functions in the Alliance is to supply coal, boots, clothing, and other munitions of war to our Allies, it is imperative for us to maintain a large industrial population working for export. So far we have not adopted conscription, and our enemies infer that the British workman is too sordid to make sacrifices for his country. In this they grossly misjudge the stuff of which our people is made. The British workman is no coward. If he dislikes the thought of conscription, as many do, it is not from cowardice, but because he thinks first that a society ought not to be permanently organised for war and next that a conscript army places in the hands of the Government of the day a weapon which may be used with irresistible force to promote the interests of capital. But whatever may be their political beliefs the working population of this country are determined to support their comrades in the field. If they are convinced by reason that nothing short of conscription will give us victory, they will accept conscription, not as a social principle, but as the instrument of an emergency. That they are not yet convinced is nothing to their discredit for, indeed, it is by no means clear that, given the circumstances, the country could have entered the war with more unanimity, supported it with more alacrity, or laid a sounder financial or military groundwork for the gradual and complete incorporation of all the varied energies of the nation in the single task of subduing the enemy.

The country should not be judged by its more hysterical newspapers. If we wish soberly to take stock of what England is doing, there is no better method than to compare the state of things in our own immediate neighbourhood—and the larger our circle of acquaintance and the size of the community in which we live the more striking the comparison will be—now and a few months since. It seems as if everybody was being steadily drawn by some great force of suction into the war service, which is also the peace service of the nation. Girls are banding together to work in the fields. Young women of good family are learning to nurse or to milk cows or take the place of men clerks called away on active service. Schoolboys in Eton jackets make tools for the munition workers. Professors and lecturers inspect shells. To keep accounts for an armament firm has become an object of patriotic ambition. And meanwhile recruiting goes on steadily, the men coming in, not in response to sensational appeals, for these have little weight, but mainly by reason of the massive force of public opinion and their own sense of honourable duty. It is not dramatic, it is just quietly impressive—this spectacle of a nation steadily and by increasing degrees absorbing itself in the business of war. That some regions are as yet unaffected by the disturbing vision of the country's need is true enough and greatly to be deplored, but their isolation will not endure. The momentum of patriotic service will carry, does carry, everything before it.

## APPENDIX A.

## COMPARATIVE NAVAL LOSSES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY UP TO JULY, 1915.

## BRITISH LOSSES.

7 Battleships.  
 6 Cruisers.  
 3 Light Cruisers.  
 2 Torpedo Gunboats.  
 2 Destroyers.  
 1 Seaplane-carrying ship.  
 5 Armed Merchant Cruisers.  
 1 Hospital Ship—Rohilla, of 7,409 tons.

Total ... 27

Name.					Displacement.	Guns.
<i>Battleships—</i>						
Bulwark	...	...	...	...	15,000 tons.	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Formidable	...	...	...	...	15,000 "	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Goliath	...	...	...	...	12,950 "	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Irresistible	...	...	...	...	15,000 "	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Majestic	...	...	...	...	14,900 "	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Ocean	...	...	...	...	12,950 "	{ 4 12-in. 12 6-in.
Triumph	...	...	...	...	11,800 "	{ 4 10-in. 14 7.5-in.
<i>Cruisers—</i>						
Aboukir	...	...	...	...	12,000 "	{ 2 9.2-in. 12 6-in.
Cressy	...	...	...	...	12,000 "	{ 2 9.2-in. 12 6-in.
Hogue	...	...	...	...	12,000 "	{ 2 9.2-in. 12 6-in.
Good Hope	...	...	...	...	14,100 "	{ 2 9.2-in. 16 6-in.
Monmouth	...	...	...	...	9,800 "	{ 14 6-in. 2 9.2-in.
Hawke	...	...	...	...	7,350 "	{ 10 6-in.
<i>Light Cruisers—</i>						
Amphion	...	...	...	...	3,440 "	10 4-in.
Pathfinder	...	...	...	...	2,940 "	9 4-in.
Pegasus	...	...	...	...	2,135 "	8 4-in.
<i>Torpedo Gunboats—</i>						
Niger	...	...	...	...	810 "	2 4.7-in.
Speedy	...	...	...	...	810 "	2 4.7-in.
<i>Destroyers—</i>						
Maori	...	...	...	...	980 "	2 4-in.
Recruit	...	...	...	...	335 "	{ 1 12-pdr 5 6-pdr



Name.	Displacement.	Guns.
<i>Sea-plane Carrying Ship—</i>		
Hermes... ..	5,600 tons.	11 6-in. wire.
<i>Armed Merchant Cruisers—</i>		
Bayano... ..	5,948 "	—
Clan Macnaughton ... ..	4,985 "	—
Oceanic... ..	17,274 "	—
Viknor ... ..	—	—
Princess Irene ... ..	6,000 "	—

## GERMAN LOSSES.

- 5 Cruisers.
- 11 Light Cruisers.
- 7 Gunboats.
- 10 Destroyers.
- 2 Torpedo Boats.
- 2 Survey Ships.
- 1 Special Vessel.
- 6 Armed Auxiliaries.
- 1 Mining vessel, viz.: Albatross, of 2,200 tons, carrying 8 3·5 in. guns.
- 16 Fitted for use as Armed Auxiliaries, but not known to carry guns.
- 1 Hospital Ship, viz.: Ophelia, of 1,153 tons.

Total ... 62

Name.	Displacement.	Guns.
<i>Cruisers—</i>		
Blücher ... ..	15,500 tons.	{ 12 8·2-in. 8 6-in.
Scharnhorst... ..	11,600 "	{ 8 8·2-in. 6 6-in.
Gneisenau ... ..	11,600 "	{ 8 8·2-in. 6 6-in.
Yorck ... ..	9,050 "	{ 4 8·2-in. 10 6-in.
Friedrich Karl ... ..	9,050 "	{ 4 8·2-in. 10 6-in.
<i>Light Cruisers—</i>		
Karlsruhe ... ..	4,900 "	12 4·1-in.
Mainz ... ..	4,350 "	12 "
Köln ... ..	4,350 "	12 "
Emden ... ..	3,600 "	10 "
Dresden ... ..	3,600 "	10 "
Nürnberg ... ..	3,450 "	10 "
Königsberg ... ..	3,400 "	10 "
Leipzig ... ..	3,250 "	10 "
Ariadne ... ..	2,660 "	10 "
Magdeburg ... ..	4,550 "	12 "
Hela ... ..	2,040 "	{ 4 15½-pr. 6 6-pr.

Name.	Displacement.	Guns.
<i>Gunboats—</i>		
Ilitis ... ..	900 tons.	{ 4 15½-pr. 6 1-pr.
Jaguar ... ..	900 "	{ 4 15½-pr. 6 1-pr.
Luchs ... ..	900 "	{ 2 4·1-in. 6 1-pr.
Tiger ... ..	900 "	{ 2 4·1-in. 6 1-pr.
Cormoran ... ..	1,630 "	{ 8 4·1-in. 5 1-pr.
Geier ... ..	1,630 "	{ 8 4·1-in. 5 1-pr.
Eber ... ..	1,000 "	{ 2 4·1-in. 6 1-pr.
<i>Destroyers—</i>		
V. 187 ... ..	circ. 600 "	2 24-pr.
S. 116 ... ..	} " 450 "	4-pr.
S. 115 ... ..		
S. 117 ... ..		
S. 118 ... ..		
S. 119 ... ..		
S. 90 ... ..	" 350 "	3 "
S. 124 ... ..	" 400 "	3 "
Taku ... ..	" 200 "	2 "
One (name unknown) sunk by submarine off Windau on June 5, 1915.		
<i>Torpedo Boats—</i>		
A. 2 ... ..	About 100 tons.	Light.
A. 6 ... ..	" 100 "	"
<i>Armed Auxiliaries—</i>		
	Gross Tonnage.	
Berlin ... ..	17,324 tons.	6 4·1-in.
Cap Trafalgar ... ..	18,710 "	2 "
Cormoran ... ..	3,522 "	8 "
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse ... ..	14,349 "	4 "
Kronprinz Wilhelm ... ..	14,908 "	2 4·7-in.
Prinz Eitel Friedrich ... ..	8,897 "	4 4·1-in.
<i>Fitted for use as Armed Auxiliaries but not known to carry guns—</i>		
Bethania ... ..	7,548 "	—
Eleonore Woermann ... ..	4,624 "	—
Gneisenau ... ..	8,185 "	—
Graecia ... ..	2,799 "	—
Itolo ... ..	299 "	—
Königin Luise (minelayer) ... ..	2,163 "	—
Markomannia ... ..	4,505 "	—
Max Brock ... ..	4,579 "	—
Navarra ... ..	5,794 "	—
Prinz Adalbert ... ..	6,030 "	—
Seydlitz ... ..	8,008 "	—
Spreewald ... ..	3,899 "	—
Sudmark ... ..	5,154 "	—



## APPENDIX B.

TABLE ILLUSTRATING COURSE OF FOREIGN TRADE,  
FEBRUARY TO JUNE, 1914 AND 1915.(A) *Total Imports.*

—	1914.	1915.	Increase (+) or Decrease (—) in 1915, compared with 1914.	
			Amount.	Proportion Per cent.
	£	£	£	
February ... ..	62,054,000	65,464,000	(+) 3,410,000	5·5
March ... ..	66,947,000	76,193,000	(+) 9,246,000	13·8
April ... ..	61,627,000	73,882,000	(+) 12,255,000	19·9
May ... ..	59,099,000	72,486,000	(+) 13,387,000	22·7
June ... ..	58,282,000	74,942,000	(+) 16,660,000	28·6
Total 5 months	308,009,000	362,967,000	(+) 54,958,000	17·8

(B) *Exports of United Kingdom Produce.*

February ... ..	41,262,000	26,177,000	(—) 15,085,000	36·6
March ... ..	44,519,000	30,176,000	(—) 14,343,000	32·2
April ... ..	39,947,000	32,170,000	(—) 7,777,000	19·5
May ... ..	42,051,000	33,619,000	(—) 8,432,000	20·1
June ... ..	39,873,000	33,234,000	(—) 6,639,000	16·7
Total 5 months	207,652,000	155,376,000	(—) 52,276,000	25·2

(C) *Exports of Foreign and Colonial Produce.*

February ... ..	10,229,000	6,810,000	(—) 3,419,000	33·4
March ... ..	9,536,000	8,067,000	(—) 1,469,000	15·4
April ... ..	10,789,000	9,957,000	(—) 832,000	7·7
May ... ..	10,372,000	10,243,000	(—) 129,000	1·2
June ... ..	8,753,000	9,350,000	(+) 597,000	6·8
Total 5 months	49,679,000	44,427,000	(—) 5,252,000	10·6

(D) *Total Exports.*

February ... ..	51,491,000	32,987,000	(—) 18,504,000	35·9
March ... ..	54,055,000	38,243,000	(—) 15,812,000	29·2
April ... ..	50,736,000	42,127,000	(—) 8,609,000	17·0
May ... ..	52,423,000	43,862,000	(—) 8,561,000	16·3
June ... ..	48,626,000	42,584,000	(—) 6,042,000	12·4
Total 5 months	257,331,000	199,803,000	(—) 57,528,000	22·4

TABLE ILLUSTRATING FOOD IMPORTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FEBRUARY TO JUNE, 1914 AND 1915.

TOTAL IMPORTS OF MEAT (INCLUDING ANIMALS FOR FOOD) AND GRAIN AND FLOUR, FEBRUARY TO JUNE, 1914 AND 1915.

(1) *Total Imports of Meat (including Animals for Food).*


—	1914.	1915.*	Increase (+) or Decrease (–) in 1915, compared with 1914.	
			Amount.	Per cent.
	£	£	£	
February ... ..	5,077,000	6,262,000	(+) 1,185,000	23·3
March ... ..	5,638,000	8,022,000	(+) 2,384,000	42·3
April ... ..	5,948,000	7,628,000	(+) 1,680,000	28·2
May ... ..	5,433,000	7,458,000	(+) 2,025,000	37·3
June ... ..	4,935,000	7,435,000	(+) 2,500,000	50·7
Total 5 months	27,031,000	36,805,000	(+) 9,774,000	36·2

(2) *Total Imports of Grain and Flour.*

February ... ..	4,621,000	7,266,000	(+) 2,645,000	57·2
March ... ..	5,570,000	9,603,000	(+) 4,033,000	72·4
April ... ..	5,534,000	9,418,000	(+) 3,884,000	70·2
May ... ..	4,752,000	9,987,000	(+) 5,235,000	110·2
June ... ..	6,276,000	9,613,000	(+) 3,337,000	53·2
Total 5 months	26,753,000	45,887,000	(+) 19,134,000	71·5

\* The figures for February, March, April, and May have been revised to include certain amounts which were not available when the respective Monthly Accounts were published, but which were included in the published June Accounts. These amounts have been excluded from the figure given above for June. The June figure is also exclusive of certain imports during that month, particulars of which are not yet available.





















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